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Social Movements in the Information Communication Technology Age: 
The Case of Hong Kong1
Abstract
This paper develops current understandings of social movements by incorporating research on state formation and counter-
insurgency, expanding political process theory by introducing the concepts of legibility and capacity.  It then considers the 
changes caused by widespread use of Internet communications technologies (ICTs).
The paper conceptualizes state-movement contention as a competition for access to civil society and its resources.  Movements 
and states attempt to maximize their access, otherwise known as capacity, and minimize that of their rival.  The legibility of 
society to either side impacts their success.  Success, or lack thereof, determines future capacity.
Increased usage of ICTs and digital surveillance have decentralized movements, changing their organizational structures from 
hierarchical to decentralized and interlinked structures.  Capacity, legibility, and action all take place through semi-spontaneous 
individual efforts, and knowledge and tactics are spread through social, not organizational, networks. As a result, trust has be-
come a key component of capacity, rivalling – if not replacing – legibility.
BACKGROUND
For most of the past year, Hong Kong has blazed with 
protests, driven by a single movement locked in contention with 
the government. The movement is distinguished by its unusual 
resilience and flexibility, able to survive repression and shift 
from peaceful assemblies to street battles to electioneering to 
aid provision and back again.  In the past, such flexibility was 
the exclusive preserve of groups with centralized leaderships.2 
Yet the consciously leaderless Hong Kongers have been able to 
adapt while maintaining their resilience. As tear gas swept the 
streets, and large messaging channels lit up with information 
about police movements, requests for aid, and tactical advice, a 
new style of protest took shape, and is being replicated around 
the world.3
1 Thanks to Professor Nathaniel Raymond and Isabel Salinas-Arreola 
for their help throughout the paper-writing process.
2 See Tufekci 2017
3 See reddit links in bibliography; additionally, based on anecdotal 
information, the protests in Portland, Oregon seem to have similar 
structures
THEORY:
This paper focuses on the competition between so-
cial movements and states over ideas, spaces, and, most im-
portantly, access to the limited resources of civil society.4This 
includes institutional resources, such as organizational funds, 
contact lists, and facilities; and individual resources, such as 
logistical skills and physical presence.  States and movements 
require these resources to build capacity, achieve their goals, 
and ultimately, survive.  The more resources each side taps 
into, the greater their own penetration into civil society, the 
greater their capacity for action, and the fewer resources avail-
able to their rival.  
Capacity consists of the ability to convey information, 
to create and control narratives, and to mobilize and organize 
people.5 It is expressed through the mobilization of groups of 
4 This is a loaded term, but I have chosen to combine the concepts from 
Mattingly 2020 and Keck and Sikkink 1998
5 Gee 2011; note that this definition combines some elements of the 
state formation literature’s understanding of capacity, but leaves out 
others.  See Mann 1986
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people behind a narrative framework in displays of worthiness, 
unity, numbers, and commitment that signal a movement’s 
power.6 In short, the ability to effectively take action against 
legible targets. States and movements allocate limited resourc-
es between action and legibility. They aim to maximize capac-
ity and limit disruption.
Action, which encompasses the coercive and persua-
sive tools of a movement or state, is used to achieve goals, 
ranging from increasing legibility to recruiting new members. 
The methods include staging marches, ordering arrests, and es-
tablishing surveillance, among others. 
Legibility is knowledge of society.7 It reflects how 
well a state or movement understands their surrounding so-
ciety and refines its ability to act.8 States generally have little 
idea of the makeup of society, due to their limited penetration 
into it.  Movements, by contrast, are embedded within society. 
Historically, they emerge from society, meaning they initially 
are illegible to the state.  Movements thus seek to capitalize on 
their superior legibility and deny it to the state, while the state 
tries to reorganize society into legible form.  
This view is solidly on the structuralist side of social 
movement literature.  Structuralist theories emphasize the im-
portance of external variables, such as the social networks a 
movement can tap into,9  the particular repertoires permitted or 
forbidden by the state,10  or the willingness of elites to defect. 
People, their reasons for protest, and their way of understanding 
the world, are bracketed to focus on broader movement-state 
dynamics.  Societies always have grievances simmering below 
the surface, and people are naturally drawn by affinity to form 
groups.  Those that succeed must have access to resources or 
opportunity.11  This paper particularly draws on political pro-
cess theory, which points to organizational strength, insurgent 
consciousness, and political opportunity as the main factors 
determining the success of a movement.  This paper adds leg-
6 Tilly 2006
7 Scott 1998, the concept is central to much of the rest of his work as 
well
8  Ibid.
9  McAdam 1982, among others
10  Tilly 2006, among others
11  A common premise of resource mobilization theory.  See Aslanidis 
2012
ibility and capacity to the list of critical factors for success. 
Movements which remain illegible for longer and to whom 
society is more legible are able to better develop capacity and 
exploit opportunities.
This departs from the current trend in social move-
ment theory.  Current literature strongly emphasizes the role 
of individuals and their decision-making process.  The field 
of study has narrowed to “grievances, resources, political op-
portunities or processes of meaning construction,” with a par-
ticular focus on individual rational choice and framing – the 
process of individually creating meaning.12  Approaches em-
phasize the agency of organizers and movement members. 13
I have chosen to return to structural theories because 
they better characterize the state. In modern literature, the state 
tends to be treated as a static “cost of protest” which movement 
members evaluate.14  It may change, but it is never an actor in 
itself. By contrast, structuralist theories envision the state as an 
actor, consciously responding to new innovations and chang-
es in circumstance.  The specific behaviors and goals of the 
state are drawn from the rich work on state decision-making 
and goals that have been generated by the state formation and 
counter-insurgency literatures, particularly their emphases on 
legibility and contention.15   
Information communication technologies (ICTs), par-
ticularly encrypted social media and messaging apps, change 
this calculus of capacity.  They enhance both the ability to act 
and to control legibility, reducing costs and opening up new 
avenues of action, communication, and surveillance.  They 
allow movements to not only reach civil society much more 
easily, but to instantaneously share techniques and knowledge 
worldwide, creating spaces where they can refine ideas and 
train activists before engaging with the broader public.16 On 
the other hand, ICT communications produce data, making 
users increasingly legible to states.  More legible data means 
more legible people, information which the state can exploit 
12  Klandermans 1997, cited in Aslanidis 2012
13  Opp 2009, cited in Aslanidis 2012 and Jasper 2011, Klandermans 
1997
14  For example, see Kuran, 1994, as well as Aslanidis 2012
15  See Mann 1986, Kalyvas 2012 and Galula, 1964
16  See Fraser 1990
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through conventional (e.g. arrests, harassment) or unconven-
tional means (e.g. trolls, doxing).  
ICTs reduce the cost of capacity.  Coordinating a mass 
march, once an immense logistical feat, now can be arranged 
over smartphone.17  Identifying an individual, once expensive, 
now can be done with an algorithm.18 Everything takes fewer 
resources, so both state and movement are able to spend their 
newfound surplus on further legibility and action.  Where ICTs 
are widespread, then, contention will be more intense, and 
more of society will be mobilized.
More intense protests present a threat to any state, but 
are regarded with particular concern by repressive regimes.19 
Regimes have a long history of harassing and imprisoning dis-
sidents to preempt movements, but ICTs make this easier than 
ever.20 Repression, combined with more protestors rejecting 
leadership structures, have flattened movement organization-
al structures.21 Rather than a center issuing dictates to the pe-
riphery, small groups connect dynamically, reconfiguring their 
organization to efficiently handle problems. Organizers, once 
leaders of movements, now coordinate, network, and filter, 
helping disseminate tactics, connect groups, and verify infor-
mation.  ICTs, combined with sufficient state repression, lead 
to movement structure resembling a mesh network.22 
HONG KONG:
Hong Kong has spent nearly two centuries under the 
rule of a distant power.  Locals in general, and non-elites in 
particular, were ignored by the state, so they turned to con-
tention.  During British occupation, “wave after wave of col-
lective actions” took place.23 Movements frequently succeed-
ed and their leaders were occasionally even incorporated into 
17  Compare, for instance, the planning processed behind the 1963 
March on Washington and the 2016 Women’s march; the former took 
much longer and was more intense than the latter
18  Soldatov 2017
19  Mattingly 2020
20  Ibid., among many, many other sources
21  Kuran 1991, Fraser 1990
22  A term from network theory and computer science referring to a 
collection of nodes which connect dynamically and consultatively; see 
Grieg 2018
23  Chen, Albert HY, 2009, “Social Movements and the Law in 
Post-Colonial Hong Kong” p. 3
the governing elite.24 Organizing protests thus became a way 
for the disenfranchised to make their voices heard.25 This sort 
of movement-led contention practically became an informal 
branch of Hong Kong’s government.26  
Movements were part of the language of politics, and 
post-handover Hong Kong saw an “explosion of social pro-
tests.”27 Largest of these were the 2003 protests against Arti-
cle 23, an anti-sedition bill. Since then, a new movement has 
emerged every two to three years, on average, as well as an-
nual commemorative marches.28 Such a history makes the city 
an ideal example of both social movement dynamics and the 
effects of ICTs.
ANALYSIS:
The theory would predict that contention between 
government and movement in Hong Kong would be incred-
ibly intense, given Hong Kong’s high levels of ICT use and 
ownership.  Not only would reduced cost of action lead to 
frequent and large-scale action, the reduced cost of legibility 
should lead to both sides understanding society while encryp-
tion renders them illegible to one another.  While contention 
was incredibly intense, resources dedicated to legibility pla-
teaued.  Interviewees unanimously pointed to trust, rather than 
legibility, as the key component of capacity.  Both state and 
movement spent a substantial amount of resources on ensur-
ing or disrupting trust, rather than building legibility or taking 
action as a capacity-centric theory would predict. Once a base-
line level of legibility/illegibility is reached, trust appears to 
take on equal, if not greater, importance than legibility. 
MOVEMENT STRUCTURE:
The movement’s focus on trust rather than legibili-
ty comes from its decentralized structure.  Social movements 
in Hong Kong have been decentralizing since 2014.  The 
post-Umbrella prosecutions of Joshua Wong and other leaders 
made activists conscious of their legibility; most moved away 
24  King, Ambrose YC, 1973 “The Administrative Adoption of Politics 
in Hong Kong”, cited in Kuan 1979
25  Chen 2009
26  Ibid.
27  Chen 2009
28  Cheng, interviewed 4/13/20
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from traceable platforms like Facebook and avoided publicity.29 
Many activists were also suspicious of would-be leaders, and 
“there [was] no trust between the political system and civil so-
ciety.”30 Many protestors believed that the 2014 movement had 
been fatally weakened when it was “hijacked by political par-
ties.”31 Those parties had attempted to impose codes of conduct 
on protestors, enforced by party members.  These members also 
served as liaisons, conveying strategic decisions and tactical re-
quests back and forth between leadership and protestors.32  
The 2019 movement rejected this, remaining con-
sciously leaderless.33 “Most of the activities/ events are 
self-initiated instead of organized by political parties as in the 
past,” with protestors organizing through personal networks.34 
Protestors first communicated primarily over LIHKG, a local 
website, then over Telegram and Signal. Objectives, training, 
figures, and mascots emerged –  meme-like –  from a dense 
network of communication channels and chatrooms.35 Individ-
ual protestors would both join the larger general channels and 
create their own group chats consisting of friends and other 
protestors who they had met and worked with.36 These chats 
were used to share information, make plans, and coordinate 
times and places of action.  The largest channels, such as 612 
Reminder, helped share vital information and amplify the 
voices of individuals or groups in need, while smaller groups 
served as incubators for new techniques. 
Small groups made up the majority of this commu-
nication ecosystem.  They formed around tasks, ranging from 
first-aiders, to firemen, to legal aiders.37 Other groups formed 
as protestors cemented connections with one another, or with 
reliable sources of supplies, first aid, and transit, via Telegram 
groups.38 Most coordination and planning took place within 
29  https://pen.org/advocacy-case/joshua-wong-alex-chow-nathan-law/
30  Lo, 4/10/20
31  Cheng 4/25/20
32  Ibid.
33  Though civil society and political parties made extensive efforts to 
bury the hatchet and present a united front
34  Wan 4/2/20
35  Maureen 4/23/20; see Mina 2019 for further discussion, and Figure 
1 for an example
36  Maureen, interview 4/23/20, Alex, interview 4/18/20
37  Wan, interview 4/2/20
38  Cheng, 4/25/20
these small networks, making each one a vessel of capacity.  A 
given movement member stood at a nexus of networks, whose 
members ranged from fellow protestors to friends and family.39 
ICTs both made such network structures possible and were 
used to make them illegible to the state.
A patchwork of anonymous “admins” linked these 
groups to one another and to the big channels.40 Admins were 
either the creators of larger channels or experienced protest-
ers with extensive networks. They vetted and passed on infor-
mation, and arranged transit, clothing changes, and legal aid, 
among many other roles.  “The admins were always online,” 
and played a key role in tying together frontline protestors and 
various support groups.41 Admins were the nervous system of 
the movement, and communicated primarily through trusted 
intermediaries.42 These admins were not leaders by another 
name; they “[wouldn’t] initiate anything” on their own.43  
Spontaneous organization was also common.  Sup-
plies were frequently passed via human chain, often nearly 
across the island.44 Tactical changes were passed the same 
way.  “Someone would yell out a new destination, and the en-
tire march would change direction.”45  The combination of de-
centralized networks of decision-making, admins, and willing-
ness to accept decisions formed the basis of the movement’s 
flexibility, which in turn made the movement less legible and 
harder to disrupt. This structure, with many small, specialized 
groups operating in concert, connected by individuals, epito-
mizes the modern movement. 
TRUST AND CAPACITY
Within this structure, “[Everything] depend[ed] on 
trust.”46 Protestors would not interact online unless it was 
“known to be safe,” meaning they knew and had met every 
member in person.47 Everyone used group-specific shibbo-
39  Ibid.
40  Cheng, 4/13/20
41  Cheng 4/25/20
42  Cheng, 4/13/20
43  Matt, 4/22/20
44  Maureen, 4/3/20
45  Ibid.
46  Cheng, 4/25/20
47  E.g. designed to be intentionally inaccessible to the government ; 
Maureen interview 4/23/20
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leths to verify their identity, ranging from Cantonese internet 
slang to their real name.48 Admins “were trusted only because 
of their past organizing and protesting experience,” and cit-
ed it to prove their trustworthiness.49 Interviewees as a whole 
frequently mentioned the vital importance of trust, especially 
with regards to buying “stationary,” a euphemism for sensitive 
supplies that would be left for protestors to retrieve.50 
While protest has always relied on trust, and mass pro-
test in particular, the mostly anonymous communications eco-
system in Hong Kong intensified the demand.  Accounts, even 
those entirely uninvolved with activism, on Telegram, LIHKG, 
and other platforms frequently display no identifying informa-
tion.51 As a result, Hong Kong lacked the radical, all-encom-
passing trust which had characterized earlier movements like 
Occupy.52 “[I had] to be skeptical,” noted multiple interview-
ees, since anonymous accounts could be anyone and “I don’t 
trust anyone.”53  Such demand was reinforced by the knowl-
edge that the only way to get information from the “safety of 
Telegram” would be to infiltrate a group.54 Thus, trust in one’s 
fellow group members limited one’s potential legibility.  This 
connection only grew stronger as protestors embraced addition-
al legibility-reduction techniques, such as wearing facemasks, 
paying train fare with cash, and using lasers to interfere with 
cameras.55 Other members went even further, using “clean” 
(burner) phones with “VPN, new SIM card, all the safety mea-
sures.”56 Admins, among the most cautious of all, were most 
afraid of trusting the wrong person and revealing secrets or 
spreading false information as a result.57  Trust also played a 
vital role in coordinating action.  The spontaneous changes in 
direction and fluid response to requests for help would not have 
been possible without a deep trust among protestors. 
On the government side, while it is cheaper than ever 
48  Internet slang from Maureen 4/23/20, admin from Cheng 4/13/20
49  Cheng, 4/25/20
50  Cheng, 4/25/20
51  Personal experience in contacting interviewees
52  Tufecki 2017, p. 59
53  Maureen, 4/3/20 and Matt 4/22/20
54  Alex, 4/13/20
55  See Maureen, interview 4/3/20 and Alex, interviewed 4/13/20
56  Matt, 4/22/20 and Cheng 4/13/20
57  Ibid.
to surveil and identify, decentralized protest means that the 
range of potential targets has increased.  The increase in targets 
outweighs the decrease in cost, leaving governments unable to 
support surveillance strong enough to stop movements from 
functioning. However, states have been subverting movements 
for decades, if not centuries, and the anonymity provided by 
the internet only made it easier. Entire movements, such a the 
#yosoy132 movement in Mexico, collapsed after being infil-
trated by government agents posing as organizers who turned 
its leaders against one another.58 
The government’s plainclothes police tactics illustrate 
the importance it assigned to weakening intra-movement trust. 
When plainclothes police revealed themselves and started 
making arrests, rather than targeting those who appeared expe-
rienced or essential, they instead grabbed whoever they could 
reach.59 These plainclothes police would also sometimes wear 
blue armbands or a bracelet with a red flashing light, subtly 
marking themselves as police.60 Similarly, efforts to infiltrate 
Telegram groups were “sometimes carried out from accounts 
registered with a police department email.”61 Such clumsiness 
suggests the aim was not to arrest anyone important, reducing 
the movement’s ability to act, or to infiltrate the movement, 
rendering it legible, but to sow suspicion among movement 
members. Both contenders indicated the importance of trust 
through their priorities.
The government aimed to fracture the networks of 
trust between protestors, leaving them paranoid and uncertain 
of the true intentions of nominal allies.62  Without this trust and 
faith, the movement’s supporters would be much less likely to 
contribute. It nearly succeeded. After plainclothes police re-
vealed themselves, “people started turning on each other really 
quick.”63 Groups would crumble as members were discovered 
to be passing information to the police.  A man accused of be-
ing a plainclothes officer was zip-tied and beaten. Paranoia 
grew, to the point where people only trusted friends they knew 
58  Trere, Emiliano, 2015 “The Struggle Within”
59  Maureen, Interviewed 4/23/20
60  See reddit links in bibliography
61  Maureen, interview 4/23/20
62  See Charles Tilly, Democracy
63  Maureen, interviewed 4/3/20
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in real life.64 “...after that we think, everyone, maybe he is spy, 
and our [trust] is broken.”65
Small teams and individual chats were integral to 
preserving what cohesion remained.  Because members had 
seen their fellow group-members in action, they trusted one 
another.  In many cases, they had protested and clashed with 
police side by side, or known them for years. Trust in real life 
was used to develop trust online.66 Protestors also relied on 
reputations.  Movement members who’d been leaders in previ-
ous movements were well-known, having built up credibility 
over years of pro-democracy activity. Reputations of that sort 
inspired nearly universal acceptance, if not trust, and allowed 
them to serve as “admins.”  They also further strengthened 
their credibility by using their expertise to help coordinate lo-
gistics and solve thorny tactical problems.67 These admins had 
information security protocols designed to prevent the spread 
of incorrect information, protecting their credibility and limit-
ing the spread of false or provocative stories.68  
There are a couple questions here which would benefit 
from further research.  First is the role of culture.  Hong Kong 
has a very particular culture and history of protest, so sorting 
out the way it informed the movement and their structure is 
essential. Second, research into the methods used by admins 
in particular, to screen out rumors and false reports has great 
potential.  Interlinked, decentralized networks can propagate 
false stories and cause an immense amount of harm.69 Under-
standing how information was curated and screened could 
yield insights into addressing the spread of fake news online. 
CONCLUSION:
Change in social movements, particularly ICT-driv-
64  Cheng, interview 4/13/20, Maureen, interviewed 4/23/20
65  Matt, interview 4/22/20
66  Cheng, interview 4/13/20, among others.  Also, small groups were 
sometimes penetrated, though that was relatively uncommon.  See Mau-
reen, interviewed 4/3/20
67  E.g. how to extract 200 protestors from a besieged university.  
Cheng, interview 4/25/20 
Note: to be clear, this admin system was far from efficient, let alone 
perfect.  Resources frequently were sent to incorrect locations or were 
sent in insufficient quantities. 
68  I know they exist, but they were not divulged; Cheng interview 
4/25/20
69  As has happened with WhatsApp chats in India, among other places
en change, has been characterized by the steady delegation of 
more and more capacities originally held by central organiz-
ers to the crowd, and the shrinking down of the units within 
movements from organizations to trust networks, driven by an 
underlying need to not only resist legibility but also to main-
tain trust. 
Networks of groups of people and their close, trusted 
friends first provided their own narratives, then logistical sup-
port, then their own leadership and decision making.  In the 
place of the perfectly organized marches has arisen a messy, 
spontaneous process grounded within the local cultural context 
and informed by the experience of past movements.  Move-
ment structures have transformed from a center informing a 
periphery to a coordinated network of networks communicat-
ing within itself.  A network-of-networks structure has allowed 
the Hong Kong movement to be more resilient, flexible, and 
adaptable than an equivalent centralized structure.  This has 
also been visible in the ad hoc response to coronavirus, as 
groups have sprung up to deliver masks and other needed sup-
plies to those in need.70 
This is not necessarily the future of movements.  The 
Hong Kong movement evolved in response to specific con-
ditions, including effective and aggressive targeting of move-
ment leaders and a repressive state response.  In countries 
without these traits, intertwined individual and movement net-
works provide little benefit. What will carry over, however, is 
the fundamental shift: movements no longer primarily tap into 
societal networks, but rather build on and evolve from them, 
relying on individuals and personal networks rather than orga-
nizers and organizational networks.
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